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This article: At a time when the working conditions of fashion models are receiving the attention of policy-
makers and key industry players in the UK and beyond, this article proposes to revalorise models’ rights to 
legal protection using intellectual property (IP) law. More specifically, it argues that it is possible to extend 
performers’ rights to runway models by taking advantage of flexibilities in current legislation and case law. 
This analysis goes back to the basics of intellectual property law by re-examining the definitions of protected 
performances under national and international law. Noting the fact that both sets of definitions, national and 
international, define protected performances as those which are the interpretations of a ‘work’, this article 
considers whether runway models can be seen as performers, building on the recognition of fashions shows as 
‘copyright works’ in Ashby (2013). As a result, Ashby has opened new avenues for the application of 
performers’ rights to runway modelling due to the connection between the subsistence of a copyright ‘work’ 
and the subject matter covered by performers’ rights.  
 
1. Introduction: runway models, on the centre stage yet invisible 
Fashion is a thriving multi-billion pound industry in the UK.1 As such, national policy-
makers have emphasised the need to ensure adequate protection and remuneration of the 
industry’s hidden hands, i.e. low-profile creative professionals, to maintain the 
competitiveness of the sector on the eve of Brexit.2 Whilst it may seem contradictory to liken 
runway models to the industry’s hidden hands given the intrinsic visibility of their profession, 
their precarious position has long been acknowledged on many levels, not only economic. 
Sector-wide changes to address this situation are notable as principles of best practice 
ensuring decent working conditions are being endorsed,3 but the question of models’ 
remuneration is a central issue that is yet to be addressed.  
                                                             
* Lecturer in Law at the University of Exeter. I am indebted to the members of the Science, Culture and Law 
Research Centre, notably Ms Andrea Wallace, Dr Rebecca Helm and Dr Naomi Hawkins. I am also grateful to 
Pr. Charlotte Waelde, Dr Séverine Saintier, Dr Kubo Mačák and Pr Andrea Lista for their thoughtful comments 
on earlier versions of this paper. Any mistakes or errors are my own.  
1 British Fashion Council, The Economic Value of Fashion (2015); British Fashion Council, ‘London Fashion 
Week – Facts and Figures’ (13 September 2017) <http://www.britishfashioncouncil.com/pressreleases/London-
Fashion-Week-September-2017-Facts-and-Figures> accessed 30 March 2018, citing Fashion United, Statistics 
Report (2017).  
2 British Fashion Council, Positive Fashion Report (2014); British Fashion Council, ‘Government Relations’ 
(undated) < http://www.britishfashioncouncil.co.uk/About/Government-Relations> accessed 29 April 2018.  
3See, Equity and others, LFW Model Program (2010); Equity, ‘Ten point Code of Conduct for the Treatment 
of Models during Photo Shoots in Studios and on Location’ (12 November 2012) 
<https://www.equity.org.uk/documents/ten-point-code-of-conduct/> accessed 29 April 2018 ; British Fashion 
Council, ‘Best Practice Guide For Model Agencies’ (2017) < 
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It is commonly held that runway models are poorly paid for their work. In actual fact, little 
is officially reported on this question, aside from anecdotal comments about supermodels’ 
exceptionally high earnings jarring in comparison to the implied understanding that most 
runway models are otherwise paid ‘in clothes, not cash’.4 The organisations who advocate 
for minimum standards of remuneration themselves do not provide tangible evidence 
assessing the scope of the issue.5 This dearth of publicly available information may indicate 
how sensitive this topic remains within the sector.  
Today, the fate of fair remuneration for models relies on the good will of key industry 
players,6 as current employment regulation does not provide safeguards or encouragement 
for breakthroughs on this point.7 As modelling professionals find no regulatory framework 
to which anchor their negotiation, their bargaining position continues to be undercut, and so 
despite the fact that they have recently coalesced within unions.8  Accordingly, this article 
turns to intellectual property law to bridge this gap by envisaging runway models’ eligibility 
to performers’ rights found in the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA).9  
Performers’ rights are a relevant avenue to explore for a number of reasons. First, performers’ 
rights provide the means to secure access to a stream of revenues. These intellectual property 
rights confer the right to control and therefore to monetise the fixation and distribution of 
one’s performance,10 such as a model’s runway walk. They also grant the right to equitable 
                                                             
http://www.britishfashioncouncil.com/uploads/files/1/Best%20Practice%20Guide%20for%20Model%20Age 
ncies%20%20.pdf > accessed 29 April 2018. See also, British Fashion Council, Fashioning a Healthy Future: 
The Report of the Model Health Inquiry (September 2007) < 
http://www.britishfashioncouncil.co.uk/uploads/files/1/The%20Report%20of%20the%20Model%20Health%
20Inquiry,%20September%202007.pdf> accessed 31 July 2018; British Fashion Council, Review of Model 
Health Inquiry Recommendations and Opportunities (February 2016) < 
http://www.britishfashioncouncil.co.uk/uploads/files/1/Model%20Health%20Inquiry%20Review%20Feb%20
16.pdf> accessed 31 July 2018. . 
4 See Grace Cook, ‘Anatomy of a Catwalk Show —And How the Model Industry Works’, The Financial Times 
(27 February 2015) < https://www.ft.com/content/274cff32-be15-11e4-8cf3-00144feab7de> accessed 31 July 
2018 ; Natalie Robehmed, ‘Highest-Paid Models 2017: Kendall Jenner Takes Crown From Gisele With $22M 
Year’, Forbes (21 November 2017) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2017/11/21/highest-paid-
models-2017-kendall-jenner-oustsgisele-with-22-million/#78fa5ac92b5c> accessed 31 July 2018.’ 
5 See for the British Fashion Council, the Model Alliance and Equity for campaigns launched without disclosing 
evidence or data. 
6 These include unions, agencies, government bodies, but goodwill is also noted within models’ employers 
(designers, fashion houses and fashion publishers), see Cook (n 4).   
7 The main piece of legislation relevant to the activity of fashion modelling is the 2003 Employment Agencies 
Regulations but the Regulations do not deal with questions of minimum standard of remuneration. The Conduct 
of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003, 2003 No. 3319.  
8 Equity became a union for models in 2007 and developed sector-wide agreement from 2010 (official website: 
< https://www.equity.org.uk/models/>. The international union Model Alliance was formed in 2012 (official 
website: <http://modelalliance.org/> both accessed 29 April 2018. 
9  1988 c. 48, as amended, Part II. It is not the purview of this article to give a detailed account of performers’ 
rights, rather their condition of subsistence which will be the focus on this analysis. 
10 CDPA, Section 182-184. 
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remuneration for the use of such performances.11 Second, performers’ rights confer 
protection in the form of moral rights.12 This enables performers to protect, with some notable 
exceptions,13 the integrity of their interpretation14 and to ensure that it is duly credited.15 The 
moral dimension of performers’ rights would echo protection recently given to models by 
the ‘anti-Photoshop decree’ in France which prohibits the photo-shopping of models’ images 
that is detrimental to the profession as well as to the public’s perception of health or beauty.16  
Finally, performers’ rights would give models’ unions unprecedented leverage in 
negotiations with other industry players in the sector. This is because performers’ rights may 
be enforced collectively through representative organisations, whilst preserving the 
possibility for individuals to retain control over their rights if desired. Furthermore, models’ 
representatives would gain in lobbying strength by joining forces with other stakeholders in 
the creative industries also recipients of performers’ rights, such as the Musicians’ Unions or 
the Actors’ Guild of Great Britain,17 whilst adding to their collective weight.  
In these regards, performers’ rights could offer the rudimentary safeguards national policy-
makers are looking to establish in the sector in terms of economic security and professional 
standards. This opportunity for change is all the more relevant given that performers’ rights 
will remain unaffected by the departure of the UK from the European Union (EU). This is 
because performers’ rights are established at national law and international treaties18 and 
where incorporated within UK law19 aside from European regulations.20 As such, the UK 
will remain bound to its international obligations following Brexit.  
                                                             
11 CDPA, Section 191G. For aspects of the regime undercutting the measure’s effectiveness, see Richard 
Arnold, Performers’ Rights (3rd, Sweet Maxwell, 2016) 117.  
12 CDPA, Chapter 3.  
13 CDPA, Sections 205E, 205G and 205J. See also, text to n 93. 
14 CDPA, Sections 205F-205H. 
15 CDPA, Sections 205C-205E. 
16 Law 2016-41 of 26 January 2016. See, Yann Basir ‘To be or not to be … photoshopped’ (2018) 13(3) JIPLP 
177. 
17 See for example the lobbying in the creative industries lead by the Musicians’ Union (Musicians’ Union, 
Campaigns < https://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Campaign > accessed 29 April 2018, the ‘Fair Internet for 
Performers’ Campaign < https://www.fair-internet.eu/description/ > accessed 29 April 2018, or Equity, 
‘Professionally Made, Professionally Paid’ < https://www.equity.org.uk/campaigns/professionally-made-
professionally-paid/ > accessed 29 April 2018.  
18 Rome Convention, Article 7; 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Chapter II; 2012 Beijing 
Treaty, Article 3(1); 1994 TRIPs Agreement, Article 14; CDPA, Part II.  
19 Performers’ Protection Act 1963, ch 53; The Performances (Moral Rights, etc.) Regulations 2006 No 18. 
20 Council Resolution of May 14, 1992 [1992] OJ C138/1EU/EC treaties status; The European Communities 
(Definition of Treaties) (WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty) Order 2005 
No 3431; Agreement on the European Economic Area, 2 May 1992, as adjusted, Protocol 28(1), Article 5(1); 
Strasbourg Convention of 11 May 1994, Article 5(1). See also text to n 66.    
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These considerations thus raise a simple yet fundamental question: can performers’ rights be 
extended to models?  
Both UK and international intellectual property laws are silent regarding models’ work. 
Indeed, unlike other national legislation,21 the CDPA neither expressly includes nor excludes 
from the scope of intellectual property rights. Accordingly, this omission provides an 
opportunity to bring models within the scope of performers’ rights under UK law, putting 
forward an interpretation that is favourable to models’ interests.  
This argument advances that there is enough flexibility within the UK intellectual property 
framework to recognise runway models as performers, and it encourages UK courts to reach 
the same conclusion. This interpretation relies on the statutory definitions of protected 
performances for it is the main condition to secure performers’ rights as are no other 
requirements to satisfy but to fit within the statutory categories of protected performances.22  
This article identifies three legal bases to qualify runway models as protected performers 
pursuant to the CDPA, the 1961 Rome Convention23 and the 1996 WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).24 The first one, and primary focus of this analysis, assesses the 
provisions of the CDPA against the minimum standard of protection required by international 
agreements to demonstrate that extending performers’ rights to runway models is, in fact, a 
matter of compliance with international law. This is because international treaties may be 
interpreted as binding the UK to extend performer’s rights to any performances of a copyright 
work. This analysis argues that runway models fit this definition since runway shows are 
recognized copyright works following the Ashby decision by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR).25 This article thus uses the Ashby jurisprudence as starting and turning point 
of the interpretation of performers’ rights and, for this reason, focuses on runway models 
exclusively. 
The other two claims for performers’ rights rely on the literal interpretation of Section 180(2) 
of the CDPA exclusively. These alternative bases have the advantage of being based on 
statutory provisions holding direct effect in the UK. However, these claims are also entirely 
                                                             
21 Like France for instance, see IPC, Article L 212-1; combined with French Employment Law Code, Articles 
L 7121-2 and L 7123-1.  
22 Except for secondary conditions related to the application of UK law. See CDPA, Section 181.  
23 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations (Rome Convention), done at Rome on 26 October 1961, incorporated in the UK in 1963 (n 21).  
24 adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996. The WPPT was incorporated in the UK in 2006 (n 21).  
The 2012 Beijing Treaty Beijing Treaty adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual 
Performances in Beijing on 24 June 2012 is not included in the purview of this article as it has yet to be ratified 
by and incorporated in the UK. See, Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, Miscellaneous No 4 (2013) 
Cm8699.  
25 Ashby Donald and Others v France [2013] ECHR 28. 
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dependent on the court’s appreciation of the ordinary meaning of a single piece of text, and 
as such, may be less reliable as a legal basis for protection.  
Going further, this article holds that, by virtue of the flexibility currently existing with the 
law, policy-makers and industry players need not wait for this interpretation to undergo 
judicial scrutiny to extend such protection to models and set new professional standards. 
Indeed, fashion industry stakeholders are well-positioned to take positive steps in awarding 
models the legal status of performers by revising contractual agreements to recognize such 
rights in present and future transactions regardless of judicial approval.  
2. The Ashby decision: a starting and turning point for performers’ rights 
In Ashby, the dispute crystallised on the right for fashion houses, the alleged rights holders 
to the copyright in fashion shows, to prevent the distribution of unauthorized photographs of 
their shows. The photographers claimed that such photographs had been taken for the purpose 
of news reporting, an act permitted by copyright exceptions safeguarding the freedom of 
expression and right to information.26 Following an application brought by fashion 
photographers, the ECtHR reviewed the decision handed down in 2008 by the French 
Supreme Court in this case.27 The ECtHR was not concerned with the subsistence of 
intellectual property rights in fashion productions. Rather, the decision focused on balancing 
the rights guaranteed by virtue of copyright and those protected by the freedom of expression 
under the European Convention of Human Rights.28 Relevant to the issue is the conclusion 
reached by the Paris Court of Appeal and French Court of Cassation which was left 
unchallenged by the parties and the European judges: that fashion shows are ‘works’ in the 
meaning of French copyright law.    
Following Ashby, several scholars have argued that UK copyright law could also be 
interpreted so as to recognize fashion shows as copyright works.29 Indeed, the condition that 
a creation be original to be protected30 could be met relatively easily by stressing the careful 
‘skill and labour’, or alternatively, the ‘author’s own intellectual input’ invested in the 
arrangements of the collections, taking into consideration timing, lighting, choreography, and 
                                                             
26 French IPC, Article L 122-9; Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (InfoSoc 
Directive), OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, Article 5.5. 
27 Cass, crim., 5 février 2008, X c/ Gaulme, Kenzo et Lacroix, n° 07-81.387: Bull. crim. 2008 N° 28 p. 109. 
28 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, Article 10.  
29 Estelle Derclaye, ‘French Supreme Court Rules Fashion Shows Protected by Copyright – What about the 
UK?’ (2008) 3 JIPL 286; Paul Torremans, ‘Ashby Donald and Others v France, Application 36769/08, ECtHR, 
5th Section Judgment of 10 January 2013’ (2014) 4 QMJIP 95; Teodore Chirvase, ‘Copyright and the Right to 
Freedom of Expression in the Knowledge Society’ (2013) 10 J Intell Prop L 324, 335. 
30 CDPA, Section 1(1)(a).  
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the visual coherence of the show together with the models’ performances.31 The shows’ 
fixation is also needed for copyright protection to follow,32 which can be achieved through 
audio-video recording or photographs. The only source of uncertainty lies in the requirement 
that fashion shows fit within the categories of protectable works set by the CDPA, a 
requirement which is absent under French law.  
However, it is generally agreed that the provisions of the CDPA offer national courts 
significant leeway to admit fashion works as valid copyright works.33 Indeed, the taxonomy 
of works prescribed by Section 3(1) of the CDPA is deemed broad enough for fashion shows 
to fall within a number of ‘works’, such as ‘dramatic works’ or ‘choreographic works’.34 
Regarding dramatic works, it can be argued that the very essence of fashion shows is to be 
performed by models walking down the runway, and that together they hold sufficient 
dramatic unity, thereby satisfying the relatively modest definition held under current UK 
precedent.35 An alternative interpretation might frame the clothing, directing and staging of 
models as a form of choreography.36  
Within this debate, the implications of the Ashby decision on models remains undiscussed. 
Yet this decision plays a pivotal role in the protection of runway models by intellectual 
property rights as current statutory provisions can be interpreted as granting performers’ 
rights to any performances of a recognized copyright work. Following Ashby, this would 
include the performance of a fashion show by runway models. It is therefore essential to turn 
to the definitions of the subject matter covered by performers’ rights to understand the stakes 
at play for models in post-Ashby jurisprudence. 
 
3. The statutory definitions of protected performances 
The definition of the types of performances covered by performers’ rights has received little 
legislative or judicial guidance since their introduction at the international level with the 
                                                             
31 Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 1 All ER 465, 469, per Lord Reid; Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int. v Danske 
Dagblades Forening [2009] ECR I-6569 (ECJ, Fourth Chamber); Case C-406/10, SAS Institute Inc v. World 
Programming Ltd [2012] 3 CMLR (4) 55, [66]-[67]. 
32 CDPA, Section 3(2).  
33 Derclaye (n 40) 287. 
34 ibid.  
35 Norowzian v Arks Ltd (No 2) [2000] EMLR 67; The Ukulele Orchestra of Great Britain v Erwin Clausen and 
another (t/a the United Kingdom Ukulele Orchestra) [2015] EWHC 1772 (IPEC); Banner Universal Motion 
Pictures Ltd v Endemol Shine Group Ltd [2017] EWHC 2600 (Ch); Green v Broadcasting Corp. of New 
Zealand [1989] RPC 469, applied in Robin George Le Strange Meakin v British Broadcasting Corporation and 
others [2010] EWHC 2065 (Ch) para 29-31, per Arnold J.;  
36 Derclaye (n 40) 287. 
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Rome Convention, and in the UK with the CPDA.37 This is in contrast to the well-
documented reluctance of national legislature and courts to see the category of protected 
performers defined too broadly.38  
Under Article 3(a), the Rome Convention defines the application of performers’ rights with 
reference to the performer. The provision reads: ‘“performers” means actors, singers, 
musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise 
perform literary or artistic works’. The WPPT reiterates verbatim the definition of protected 
performers under Article 2(a) adding ‘or expressions of folklore’ so that clause concludes 
with ‘or otherwise perform literary or artistic works or expressions of folklore’. As the two 
international agreements are almost identical and that the modification introduced by the 
WPPT did not trigger a change in UK law, deemed already compliant on this point, 
subsequent developments will only reference the Rome Convention for clarity and 
convenience of writing. Moreover, the protection by performers’ rights of ‘expressions of 
folklore’ does not affect runway models’ position.   
In comparison, the CDPA 1988 defines the scope of performers’ rights with reference to the 
‘performance’ meaning ‘(a) a dramatic performance (which includes dance and mime), (b) a 
musical performance, (c) a reading or recitation of a literary work, or (d) a performance of a 
variety act or any similar presentation, which is, or so far as it is, a live performance given 
by one or more individuals’, as per Section 180(2).  
The requirement of ‘live performance’ closing Section 180(2) of the CDPA is not defined by 
the statute, and could be interpreted as excluding pre-recorded performances and/or requiring 
that an audience be present – although this second meaning has been vigorously challenged 
for being too restrictive.39 Either way, this additional qualification introduced by the CDPA 
will not be a hindrance to runway models whose performance takes place ‘live’ in both 
respects.  
This article thus focuses on the categories of protected performers and performances listed 
under Article 3(a) of the Rome Convention and Section 180(2) of the CDPA. More 
specifically, the analysis tests the statutory interpretation of these provisions against a claim 
for protection by runway models. National and international laws answer to similar yet 
distinct interpretative methods. The interpretation of treaties such as the Rome Convention 
                                                             
37 Contrast this lack of precision with the more detailed provisions on performers’ rights under French and 
Australian laws: Australia, 1968 Copyright Act (Australia), s. 22(7), see also s. 248(2); France, IPC, Article L 
212-1, Employment Law Code, Article L Article L7121-2.  
38 ‘Documents de La Conférence de Bruxelles 5-26 Juin 1948’ (Brussels Conference Documents) (1951) 
310; MP Graham Page in HC Deb., 5th Series, Vol 679 (1963) col. 896, 897; MP Leslie Hale in in HC Deb., 
5th Series, Vol 679 (1963) col. 896, 898 ; LJ Mancroft in HL Deb 05 February 1963 vol 246 cc 512, 515; 
Musical Performers' Protection Association Ltd v British International Pictures Ltd (1930) 46 TLR 485,488.  
39 Arnold (n 11) 71-2. 
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must comply with Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,40 and 
be performed ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.41 National courts may 
include in their analysis information contained in texts annexed to the agreement that have 
been accepted as related to the treaty,42 amongst other supplementary information.43 In cases 
where the meaning of the text is either incongruous or obscure, preparatory work may also 
be admitted to clarify the content of the agreement.44  
Similarly, the traditional method of literal interpretation in the UK aims to ascertain the 
ordinary meaning of the words contained in national statutory provisions.45 Records of 
parliamentary debates may also be used in this process, since Pepper v Hart46 repealed the 
‘exclusionary rule’ which previously excluded such documents. Whilst the interpretation of 
national and international texts is based on different legal grounds, they both seek to assess 
the objective meaning of the text, by performing a literal analysis of its words as per their 
ordinary sense.  
Applying such method, this article outlines three possible legal bases to support the award of 
performers’ rights to runway models, as mentioned in introductory comments. The first 
explores the definition of protected performers under the Rome Convention to demonstrate 
that UK is bound by virtue of international obligations to extend protection to all 
interpretations of underlying ‘works’ in the meaning of copyright. Combined with the Ashby 
jurisprudence, this interpretation supports the inclusion of runway models within the scope 
of protected performers under UK law. The second and third legal bases for protection are 
based exclusively on CDPA. They examine the possibility to frame runway modelling as a 
form or ‘dramatic performance’ or ‘presentation’ as per Section 180(2)(a) and Section 
180(2)(d) of the Act. Each claim will be considered in turn, focusing more extensively on the 
first.   
 
4. A claim to performers’ rights based on the underlying copyright ‘work’ 
                                                             
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force 27 January 1980, Treaties Series No 58 (1980). 
The United Kingdom instrument of ratification was deposited on 25 June 1971 and the Convention entered into 
force on 27 January 1980.  
41 Vienna Convention, Article 31(1). 
42 Vienna Convention, Article 31(2). 
43 Vienna Convention, Article 31(3).  
44 Vienna Convention, Article 32(a)-(b).   
45 Holger Fleischer, ‘Comparative Approaches to the Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation’ 
(2012) 60(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 401.  
46 [1993] AC 593 (HL). See comments by Lord Dennning in Davis v Johnson [1979] AC 264, 276-77, Hadmore 
Production v Hamilton [1983] 1 AC 191, 201. For cases excluding parliamentary debates: Millar v Taylor 
(1769) 4 Burr 2303, 2332 (Willes J) (KB). 
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Both the national and international definition of protected performances feature the notion, 
or concept, of a ‘work’, the short-hand term used to refer to the subject matter receiving 
copyright protection under Part I of the CDPA and under the Berne Convention.  
The wording of Article 3(a) of the Rome Convention associates the definition of protected 
performers with those artists who perform ‘artistic and literary works’, mirroring the 
classification of protected subject matter covered by the Berne Convention. This suggests 
that the phrase ‘artistic and literary works’ is to be understood as a short-hand for the subject 
matter protected by the Berne Convention,47 i.e. referring to the entire class of protected 
works.48 This interpretation is also supported by the World Intellectual Property Office in 
their Guide to the Rome Convention,49 although it should be acknowledged that the Guide 
itself does not carry any normative weight.50 
A similar association between the subject matter of copyright and performers’ rights cannot 
be as readily inferred in Section 180(2) of the CDPA. Indeed, the wording of the parallel 
clauses forming Section 180(2)51 lacks symmetry. On the one hand, the first two clauses list 
‘(a) a dramatic performance’ and ‘(b) a musical performance’ without reference to an 
underlying ‘work’ in the meaning of copyright or otherwise. On the other hand, the following 
two clauses include ‘(c) a reading or recitation of a literary work’ and ‘(d) a performance of 
a variety act or any other similar presentation’ – with clear references to ‘works’ or types of 
underlying works.   
The asymmetry of the wording of Section 180(2) could be read as a compromise between 
creating consistency in the writing style of the CDPA between copyright and performers’ 
rights,52 and the wish to extent performers’ rights protection to other types of performances.53  
The wording of Section 180(2) supplanted the definition of protected performers under the 
1958 Performers’ Protection 1958 which referred to the ‘the performance of any dramatic or 
musical work’.54 In 1963, the statute incorporating the Rome Convention under UK law 
specified that the phrases ‘performance of a dramatic work’ and ‘performance of a musical 
                                                             
47 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. of September 9, 1886, completed at 
Paris, on May 4, 1896, last amended on September 28, 1979, Article 2(1).  
48 Id est as referring to the entire class of protected works not just not defined to be ‘artistic’ or ‘literary’ in the 
meaning of sections 3 and 4 of the CDPA.  
49 WIPO, Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms Convention (WIPO Guide) (Geneva, 
Publication No  617 (E) 1981) 21, para 3.1. 
50 ibid, 4.   
51 CDPA, Section 180(2)(a)-(d).  
52 Compare Section 3(1) and Section 180(1) of the CDPA.  
53 As permitted by Article 3(a) and Article 9 of the Rome Convention.  
54 1958, Section 1 and Section 8(1). See also, 1925 Act, Section 1 combined with Section 4. 
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work’ were substitutes for the definition of performers contained in the Rome Convention, 
and should be construed as such.55 No such interpretative note was repeated in the CDPA.  
In the absence of clarification in the texts and their supporting documents, the insertion of 
the word ‘work’ in the definition of the subject matter covered by performers’ rights brings 
into question the extent to which the award of intellectual property rights is conditioned by 
the subsistence of a copyright ‘work’ underlying the interpretation. Must a performance be 
an interpretation of a copyright ‘work’ to open the door for performers’ rights? What meaning 
and how much weight should be given to the insertion of the word ‘work’ in the definitions 
of protected performances or performers under UK and international law? Finally, should a 
different interpretation apply to the various clauses of Section 180(2) of the CDPA? 
These questions are central to establishing the validity of runway models’ claims to 
performers’ rights based on the Ashby jurisprudence insofar as the decision recognized 
fashion shows as full-fledged copyright works.  
Neither international preparatory work nor national parliamentary debates offer any guidance 
on the meaning or function that national courts should give to the notion of ‘works’ in the 
definition of performers’ rights.56 Consequently, this analysis applies a literal technique of 
interpretation to the relevant texts from which it deduces four possible outcomes, each 
identified as a ‘level’ of interpretation. 
 
Level 1: no correlation or connection   
The first level of interpretation infers nothing from the insertion of the word ‘work’ in either 
statutory definition. This interpretation reduces the use of the word ‘work’ as a mere 
convenience of language, and rejects any correlation with the provisions pertinent to 
copyright law.57 As a result, the subsistence of a copyright work underlying the performance 
would not be a pre-condition for the subsistence of performers’ rights.  
Such an interpretation precludes any meaningful bond between the subject matter eligible to 
performers’ rights and to copyright. The notion of ‘work’ would only attach to Part I of the 
CDPA dedicated to copyright subject matter,58 and be decoupled from any references present 
in subsequent parts of the Act. 
                                                             
55 Performers’ Protection Act 1963, Section 1(1).  
56 To the exception of ‘literary work’ which is defined as holding the same meaning under Part I and II as per 
Section 211 of the CDPA. 
57 Under the Berne Convention or Part I of the CDPA. 
58 CDPA, Sections 1(2) and (3). 
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This is the interpretation put forward by Justice Richard Arnold, the leading performers’ 
rights scholar in the UK, writing extra-judicially.59 Indeed, Arnold considers that ‘dramatic 
performances’ need not be of ‘dramatic works’ within the statute’s meaning given in Part I.60 
In his view, ‘dramatic performance’ enjoys its own independent meaning, broader in scope. 
This would be consistent with Section 211(1) of the same act which does not list ‘dramatic 
work’ within the expressions having the same meaning as in copyright provisions. Oddly, 
this interpretation would not apply to performances of ‘literary works’ as Section 211(1) of 
the CDPA specifies that the phrase carries the same meaning in the context of performers’ 
rights as it does for copyright.  
Level 2: a contributing element of definition 
The next level of interpretation continues to reject the insertion of the word ‘work’ in national 
and international statutory definitions as formally conditioning the subsistence of performers’ 
rights on the presence of an underlying copyright work. However, it does not rule out the 
identification of a copyright work as an entirely irrelevant factor. Courts may find in the 
existence of an underlying copyright work an element in favor of extending performers’ 
rights to performances falling near the margins of intellectual property law, like runway 
modelling.  
This level of interpretation mitigates the risks of any subjective shepherding as to what falls 
within the ordinary meaning of protected ‘performances’ under the CDPA and protected 
‘performers’ under the Rome Convention. Furthermore, this interpretation introduces some 
coherence between copyright and performers’ rights without forging too tight a bond or inter-
dependence between the subject matter protected by copyright and performers’ rights. 
Under the first or second levels of interpretation, the Ashby jurisprudence would bear no, or 
little, weight in the assessment of runway models’ eligibility to performers’ rights. At most 
(as per the second level), the subsistence of copyright in the fashion shows underlying 
models’ activity could be perceived as a contributing but not a deciding element of their 
eligibility. Runway models would have to resort to the alternative claims outlined in Section 
‘Alternative claims to performers’ rights for runway models’ of this article.  
Level 3: A reference point for a de minimis standard of protection  
The third, and preferred, level of interpretation suggests that use of the word ‘work’ is not 
fortuitous but implies that protected performances would be, at a minimum, those that are 
interpretations of protected or protectable ‘works’ in the meaning of copyright law.61  
                                                             
59 Arnold (n 11) 62-70.  
60 Arnold (n 11) 62-64.  
61 CDPA, Section 3.  
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As with the second level of interpretation, the third interpretation is supported by Article 9 
of the Rome Convention which specifies that ‘[a]ny Contracting State may, by its domestic 
laws and regulations, extend the protection provided for in this Convention to artists who do 
not perform literary or artistic works’.62 This article implies that the presence of a copyright 
work underlying the performance is central to the definition of protected performers under 
Article 3(a).  
Leaving considerations vis-à-vis the Rome Convention to one side, the case for this third 
level of interpretation for the CDPA’s definition of eligible performances is less straight-
forward. As previously mentioned, the association between the subject matter eligible to 
performers’ rights and copyright works in Part I of the CDPA is not as discernible under 
Section 180(2). This is, again, in part due to the asymmetry in the construction of the 
provisions’ clauses between Section 180(2)(a)-(b) and Section 180(2)(c)-(d).63  
Level 4: A requirement for the subsistence for performer’s rights   
The fourth level of interpretation of the word ‘work’ featuring in the definition or protectable 
performers or performances implies a stronger – or perhaps the strongest – link between the 
subject matter eligible to copyright protection and that covered by performers’ rights. This 
level proposes that performances must be interpretations of protected/able work under 
copyright law to be covered by performers’ rights themselves. This interpretation moves 
away from the notion of ‘work’ as merely setting a de minimis standard of protection for 
performers to it being a statutory requirement for protection. Again, this interpretation can 
be supported by a subsequent provision of the Rome Convention (Article 9) which allows, 
but does not bind, signatory states to extend protection to performances lacking an underlying 
copyright work.  
Reservations about the relevance of this level of interpretation in relation to the national text 
must be repeated here. As mentioned in the third level of interpretation, the connection 
inferred between the subject matter covered by copyright and that eligible to performers’ 
rights may not be as convincing if Section 180(2) of the CDPA is studied in isolation of other 
international texts.  
In effect, the third and fourth levels of interpretation would lead to the same result: any 
interpretations of a copyright work, whatever the genre, will automatically trigger the 
application of performers’ rights. This is the direct consequence of attributing to the 
underlying copyright ‘work’ the function of acting as requirement for protection, de minimis 
or else. However, the fourth level of interpretation will also act as bar to protection by 
                                                             
62 Emphasis added. Article 9 in the text of the treaty published by WIPO bears the heading of ‘Variety and 
Circus Artists’. This indication is an editorial modification and bears no normative weight. See, WIPO Guide 
(n 59). Nota bene Article 9 finds no equivalent provisions under the WPPT.  
63 text to n 51.  
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blocking any claims to performers’ rights which does not concern the interpretation of a 
copyright work.   
Level 3 and 4 offer the advantage of drawing clearer boundaries around the subject matter 
protected by performers’ rights. The enforcement of performers’ rights would increase in 
reliability as their scope of application would then be informed by copyright caselaw. The 
fourth level would be the most effective at mitigating against the risk of enabling all-
encompassing performers’ rights but bears the shortcoming of exerting the highest degree of 
inter-dependence between copyright and performer’s rights, giving judges little flexibility 
over the application of performers’ rights going forward. For this reason, the third level of 
interpretation is put forward as most suitable one as it offers an appropriate compromise 
between introducing consistency in the enforcement of copyright and performers’ rights 
respectively, without inferring too strong a link between the two intellectual property rights.  
A number of question arises if the court were to attribute different levels of interpretation to 
the Rome Convention and the CDPA, as it may be the case with the third and fourth level of 
interpretation. The text of the Rome Convention is clear: signatory states may grant more 
protection to more performers, but it cannot fall below what is guaranteed by the international 
agreement. The CDPA may only depart from the Rome Convention to the extent that it grants 
a more generous standard of protection than the one prescribed under the international 
agreement.64 If the Rome Convention is interpreted as intending to include within the scope 
of performers’ rights any interpretations of content covered by copyright – regardless of their 
categorization or genre – the CPDA must be interpreted in such a way that is consistent with 
this standard of protection or be reformed accordingly.65 The wording of the CDPA holds 
enough flexibility for UK courts to admit such an interpretation, and in turn, confer 
performers’ rights to runway models without need for a statutory reform to this end.66 Indeed, 
the categories of ‘dramatic performance’ or ‘any other presentation’ under Sections 180(2)(a) 
and Section180(2)(d) may be used to have the CDPA comply with the Rome Convention. 
This point is further discussed in subsequent developments.  
Failing to do so, the UK would be in breach of the Rome Convention and the WPPT. Unlike 
most international treaties, these conventions are accompanied by unusual enforcement 
methods as their implementation falls under the scrutiny of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the European Union. This is the result of the Rome Convention and the WPPT 
                                                             
64 Rome Convention, Article 7, Article 14, Article 21, Article 22. 
65 See cases outlining the duty to interpret national law in light of EU standards or international obligations: Case C-
106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internation de Alimentacion SA [1990] EU:C:1990:395, 8 (in light of EU 
legislation); C-53/96 Hermes International v FHT Marketing choice BV [1998] EU:C:1998:292, at 28 (in light of 
TRIPs); Vodafone 2 v Revenue and Customers Commissioners (No 2) [2009] EWCA Civ 446, para 37-38 per Sir 
Andrew Morritt C. Interpretation will be performed within the limits of not introducing a direct effect of international 
text, C-135/10 Societa Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Del Corso [EU:C:2012:140], 46.  
66 Should Ashby be followed by UK courts, as expected, see text to n 29. 
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being annexed to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS),67 itself annexed to the WTO Agreement.68 In turn, the WPPT Agreement, WTO 
Agreement, and de facto the TRIPS agreement, were made designated European Treaties.69 
 
5. Alternative claims to performers’ rights for runway models  
In the event that the Rome Convention is interpreted as per the first or second level, runway 
models may still rely upon the provisions of the CDPA to claim protection under performers’ 
rights. Two distinct claims may be formulated around the category of either ‘dramatic 
performance (Section 180(2)(a)) or ‘performance of a variety act or any similar 
presentation’70 (Section 180(2)(d)). In such hypotheses, UK courts must assess the act of 
walking in a fashion show against the ordinary meaning given to the legal concepts of 
‘dramatic performance’ or ‘any similar presentation’. It is submitted that the notion of 
‘dramatic performance’ would be broad enough, and more suitable, for a claim under 
performers’ rights, but the meaning given to the phrase ‘any similar presentation’ could also 
be tested.   
 
A claim based on ‘a dramatic performance’ 
Might runway modelling be likened to a dramatic performance in the ordinary sense of the 
phrase? Section 180(2) specifies that ‘dramatic performance’ includes a work of dance or 
mime, but no further guidance is given by the CDPA. Neither concept of dance or mime 
readily suits the activity of runway modelling under their ordinary meanings. Rather, runway 
modelling puts the legal definition UK legislators and case law have given to the adjective 
‘dramatic’ to the test. As there is no judicial authority available in relation to performers’ 
rights,71 commentators have turned to copyright case law on this question.72 Analogies 
                                                             
67 TRIPS, Article 14.  
68 WTO Agreement, Annex 1C.  
69 European Communities Act 1972, Section 1(2) and 1(3); European Communities (Definitions of Treaties) 
(The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization) Order 1995 No 265; European Communities 
(Definition of Treaties) (WIPO Copyright treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty) Order 2005 
No 3431. 
70 Emphasis added. 
71 At the time of writing, April 2018.  
72 Arnold (n 11) 62-63, para 2.05-2.06. It should be noted that turning to such case law have the courts indirectly 
binding with one another the subject matter protected by copyright and protected by performers’ rights as we 




between performers’ rights and author’s rights have been accepted by the courts in other 
aspects of their regimes.73 
Even in the context of copyright claims, judicial decisions considering the definition of 
‘dramatic work’ are sparse. In Norowzian (No 2),74 the Court of Appeal defined a ‘dramatic 
work’ as a ‘work of action, with or without words or music, which is capable of being 
performed before an audience’. If dramatic character resides in the presence of movement 
(‘work of action’) and the capacity of performance (‘capable of being performed’) live 
(‘before of an audience’), it appears that runway modelling could reasonably be accepted as 
a form of ‘dramatic performance’ in the meaning of Section 180(2).  
There is clear tautologism in defining dramatic performance with reference to a ‘dramatic 
work’, which is itself defined by its ability to be performed. Should this logic apply, a 
protected performance by law would a performance capable of performance. ‘Dramatic 
works’ and ‘performances’ in law would form a definitional loop.  
More recent jurisprudence proves useful in avoiding this circularity, as the definition of 
dramatic works was further tested in the High Court in Ukulele Orchestra75 and Banner.76 
Both decisions confirm the relevance of the characteristics outlined in Norowzian (No 2) and 
emphasize the essence of a dramatic work also lies in ‘coherent framework’, which can be 
repeated.77 The notion of ‘dramatic work’ would be inconsistent with un-dramatized or un-
staged expressions or expressions lacking dramatic unity.78 It is clear from the Banner 
judgment that Snowden J refrained from limiting or constraining the definition of ‘dramatic 
work’ any further; other jurisdictions have required that elements such as characters, the 
progression of a plot or a storyline be present in the work for it to be considered ‘dramatic’.79 
 
A claim based on ‘or any other presentation’  
Whilst ‘dramatic performances’ offer a suitable route for the qualification of runway 
modelling as a form of performative expression eligible to performers’ rights, the category 
                                                             
73 Henderson v All Around the World Recordings Ltd & Anor [2013] EWPCC 7, para 48 per Birss J. See also, 
Arnold (n 11) 63, para 2.05-2.06.  
74 Norowzian v Arks Ltd (No 2) [2000] EMLR 67. 
75 The Ukulele Orchestra of Great Britain v Erwin Clausen and another (t/a the United Kingdom Ukulele 
Orchestra) [2015] EWHC 1772 (IPEC). 
76 Banner Universal Motion Pictures Ltd v Endemol Shine Group Ltd [2017] EWHC 2600 (Ch).  
77 ibid, para 43-45 per Snowden J ; The Ukulele Orchestra of Great Britain v Erwin Clausen and another (t/a 
the United Kingdom Ukulele Orchestra) [2015] EWHC 1772 (IPEC) para 104-105, Hacon J.  
78 Banner Universal Motion Pictures Ltd v Endemol Shine Group Ltd [2017] EWHC 2600 (Ch) para 44. 
79 See in Australia, Aristocrat Leisure Industries Pty Ltd v Pacific Gaming Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1273, para 61-
62 per Tamberlin J. See also in the United States, Universal Pictures Co v Harold Lloyd Corporation, 162 F 2d 
354 - Circuit Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 1947, 365, citing Seltzer v Sunbrock, 22 F Supp 621 - Dist Court, 
SD California 1938, 69.   
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of ‘any other presentation’ listed in Section 180(2)(d) of the CDPA should also be explored 
as an alternative.80 This option would be particularly relevant should catwalking be dismissed 
for falling outside the ordinary meaning of ‘performance’ by the courts but within the more 
basic notion of ‘presentation’.  
It is possible that ‘any other presentation’ is to be interpreted ejusdem generis together with 
the genre of variety acts,81 which precedes it under Section 180(2)(d), although the concept 
of variety act is not entirely clear itself.82 The meaning of the phrase could be broaden so as 
to include runway modelling as also envisaged by Arnold.83  
 
6. Intellectual property policy considerations 
The policy rationales in favour of extending performers’ rights to runway models were 
outlined in introductory comments.84 This analysis now turns to the policy considerations 
which may hinder runway models’ claim for performers’ rights, focusing specifically on 
rationale arising from within intellectual property law. This is because such considerations 
have been repeatedly raised each time the legal protection of performers was subject to 
reform by policy-makers or reviewed in court.85 As such, they inevitably inform the judicial 
scrutiny paid by the courts to the Rome Convention or the CDPA, and need to be addressed. 
In reviewing each of the main policy considerations, this argument concludes that they do 
not hold a theoretical or empirical basis sound enough to block runway models’ claim to 
performers’ rights.  
The application of performers’ rights to new forms of performance is often met by the 
concern of seeing the most mundane of human activity trigger infringement proceedings.86 
In the context of catwalking, some may worry that ‘walking’ or ways of walking may be 
restricted by conferring intellectual property rights to runway models. This risk will never 
materialise for the simple reason that performers’ rights that it is legally inaccurate. Unlike 
copyright, do not grant any right, proprietary or other, over the substance of the performance. 
Performers’ rights only guarantee the right to authorize the record the performance and to 
                                                             
80 Arnold’s preferred interpretation it seems. See, Arnold (n 14) 68, para 2.17.  
81 Arnold (n 11) 68, para 2.17. 
82 Arnold (n 11) 67, para 2.15-2.16. 
83 Arnold (n 11) 68, para 2.17. 
84 text to n 9.  
85 Arnold (n 11) 4-37.  
86 See comments made by MP Graham Page in HC Deb., 5th Series, Vol 679 (1963) col 896, 897. 
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distribute such records subsequently. There is to date, no intellectual property protection 
conferred over the style of a performance, or manner in which it is rendered.87  
In contrast to the arguments made earlier, it could be argued that regarding runway models 
as performers would be detrimental to the overarching integrity of the subject matter 
protected by performers’ rights. It is the highly commercial nature of runway shows that is 
put forward as unsuited for its protection under performers’ rights, implying a lack of 
aesthetic value. This ground was notably written into the intellectual property law of other 
countries, like France, to exclude models from performers’ rights.88 However, no such 
exclusion has been written into international or UK law. There is no condition of quality, 
aesthetic content or originality for performances to secure protection under performers’ 
rights. Neither could it be inferred from the ordinary meaning of the text or its interpretation 
in good faith. This absence of condition conforms to a well-accepted principle according to 
which neither copyright nor performers’ rights should be concerned with aesthetic merits.  
Therefore, the perceived lack of artistic value of models’ performance is not sufficient to 
exclude their work from performers’ rights.   
The introduction of performers’ rights, and subsequent extension, have been met by the fear 
that courts would be flooded with groundless claims for protection by individuals far 
removed from the original definition of ‘performances’.89  A claim to performers’ rights by 
runway models could face such criticism. A counterpoint to this argument notes that the 
floodgates are already open. They were open when performers’ rights were introduced in 
national and international level with little guidance as to which performances should qualify. 
If anything, the interpretation of the law proposed here (as per Level 3 or Level 4) is one 
which provides the opportunity to fence out parasitic claims from performers’ rights by 
limiting their application to interpretations of copyright works. To date, it is the only method 
capable of rationalizing the class of protected performers which has been formulated that 
does not solely rely on judges’ appreciation of the ordinary meaning of ‘performance’, with 
the subjectivity that such an approach inevitably entails.   
The practical feasibility of rights management is another recurrent concern when new types 
of protected performers are considered, notably those involving group performances. Often 
one will read that casts of thousands, or 50-piece ensembles, would make the management 
of performers’ rights impossible in practice, i.e. not effective commercially due to transaction 
                                                             
87 Unless they amount to contributions in the nature of authorship. See, Mathilde Pavis, ‘Is There Any-Body on 
Stage? a Legal (Mis)understanding of Performances’ (2016) 19 (3-4) JWIP 99.  
88 n 21. 
89 Arnold (n 11) 11, see also text to n 38.  
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costs in the event that each individual participant should receive equal intellectual property 
rights.90  
A related concern is the fear that introducing new claimants eligible to performers’ rights 
would be detrimental to the interests of copyright holders who sit atop the hierarchy of 
interests to which intellectual property law caters. This concern is based on the view that 
copyright holders’ interests would be prejudiced economically by having to share the 
revenues generated by protected content with more stakeholders. Similarly, it has been 
argued that copyright would be emptied of its substance if their holders were to be obliged 
to seek the consent of other stakeholders, such as runway models, in the processes of creation, 
production and distribution of protected content.91  
First of all, it must be stressed that it is precisely for its capacity to disrupt the current statu 
quo that protection under performers’ rights for runway models is sought. Only then, will 
models ‘representatives be in the position to renegotiate existing business practices. As far 
as economic rights are concerned, concerns can be easily mitigated by the fact that such rights 
may be assigned by contract or managed through collective licensing92 to ease both the risk 
of disputes and the management of group performances. As long as such agreements are 
recorded in writing, there is no reason to believe that the management of performers’ rights 
should be any more onerous that the dispense of other legal obligations such as those related 
to publicity or employment rights.93  
For those rights that cannot be assigned, such as moral rights, a number of caveats have been 
introduced under international and national level to prevent protected performers from 
blocking or slowing down normal production or communication processes. The CDPA 
stresses the right to be identified as the performer ‘does not apply where it is not reasonably 
practicable’94 to do so and lists a number of specific hypotheses when this would be the case, 
such as in the context of news reporting, advertising, education or incidental inclusion of the 
performance in a recording.95  
The practical significance of this exception for performances used in the advertisement of 
goods and services found under Section 205E(4) of the CDPA will have to be defined to 
assess whether fashion shows, although recognized copyright works, are to be regarded as a 
mere exercise of goods advertising from the perspective of intellectual property law. If so, 
this may deprive runway models from the right to be identified as performers. This leaves 
                                                             
90 Arnold (n 11) 11. 
91 See for example US circuit judge McKeown discussing this issue in Garcia v Google Inc, 786 F 3d 733 (9th 
Cir 2015) 742-3.  
92 CDPA, Schedule 2A.                       
93 Henderson v All Around the World Recordings Ltd & Anor [2013] EWPCC 7, para 48 per Birss J. 
94 CDPA, Section 205E(2).  
95 CDPA, Section 205(3)-205E(5)(e).  
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the relevance of seeking performers’ rights protection unchallenged as it is other aspects of 
their regime, i.e. the economic rights and the moral right of integrity, that would prove most 
valuable to runway models continue to apply regardless of this limitation.  
Similar exceptions also apply to the moral right of integrity which runway models could use 
to prevent the inappropriate use or editing of their recorded performances. Here, the CDPA 
excludes from the scope of this prerogative ‘modifications made to a performance which are 
consistent with normal editorial or production practice’.96 Whilst there is no statutory 
definition of ‘normal editorial or production practice’, it is understood that this exception 
takes into consideration industry-specific customary practices as they evolve over time, 
weighting those against the legitimate interests of the performer.97 It should also be noted 
that moral rights may be waived in cases for those runway models which may consent to 
modifications going beyond the normal editing process.98 All of these limitations were 
introduced precisely to balance performers’ protected interest with the practical needs of 
production and distribution.  
Concerning the question of revenue distribution, there are no empirical studies available, to 
date, confirming that the market would not adapt to a new revenue split.99 Further, 
redistributing revenues fairly between the stakeholders involved in its production and 
distribution has been the aim of the most recent intellectual property law policies introduced 
at the European level. In 2016, the European Parliament introduced a proposal directive to 
implement mechanisms of shared remuneration between creators, producers and other 
intermediaries, which included performers in its scope.100 Therefore, far from being an 
unwanted side-effect, rebalancing revenues in favour of performers is an outcome desired by 
the most recent governmental proposals for reform in the field.  
Finally, from a practical perspective, the short commercial life span of fashion shows could 
be perceived as undermining the relevance of extending performers’ rights to runway models, 
since long-term large-scale licensing agreements are unlikely to be made. Indeed, without 
clear distribution channels for the photographs and recordings of fashion shows equitable 
remuneration rights would be worthless. However, as explained in introductory comments,101 
remuneration rights are only one of the three sets of rights granted by performers’ rights. The 
economic rights to consent to the first fixation of the performance and to the subsequent uses 
                                                             
96 CDPA, Section 205G(3). See also for other exceptions to this right, Section 205G(4)-205G(6)(b).  
97 Arnold (n 11) 273.  
98 CDPA Section, 205J. 
99 This argument was dismissed in the Gregory Report, see Henri Gregory, ‘Report of the Copyright Committee’ 
(1952) 61, para 172; Arnold (n 11) 4. 
100 See, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market. Brussels, 14.9.2016 COM (2016) 593 final 2016/0280 (COD), p 3, 5 and Article 15. For the 
inclusion of performers in its scope see, Recital 3, 40-43 and Chapter 3 of the Proposal.  
101 text to n 10.  
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of the record as well as the moral rights of attribution and integrity provided by the CDPA 
remain a valuable and relevant form of protection of runway models’ work that is not affected 
by short-term commercial value of fashion shows. In fact, it may be even more critical to 
have access to regulatory tools to control the first fixation and integrity of runway 
performances that the window of their commercial viability is so short. Furthermore, runway 
modelling can now be found within other forms of productions with clear distribution lines 
and extended commercial longevity, such as Reality TV franchises.102  
 
7. Conclusion 
This article demonstrates that the vagueness with which performers’ rights are defined under 
national and international law could allow runway models’ to put forward a successful claim 
for protection under performers’ rights. The analysis explored three legal bases for such a 
claim. The first one combines a literal analysis of the Rome Convention with the outcome of 
the Ashby jurisprudence to demonstrate that the UK is bound by international law to extend 
performers’ rights to any interpretations of a copyright work. This conclusion relies on three 
of the four possible literal interpretations of the statutory definitions of which ‘performers’ 
are eligible to performers’ rights under Article 3(a) of the Convention. Each interpretation 
explored a different relation of interdependence between the subject matter covered by 
copyright and the type of interpretations eligible to performers’ rights. As an alternative, the 
other two legal bases consider including runway modelling within the ‘ordinary meaning’ of 
existing categories of protected performers under Section 180(2) of the CDPA: ‘dramatic 
performance’ and ‘any other presentation’. Considering the current demands of intellectual 
property policy-makers and the stakeholders in the fashion industry as to the need for the 
better remuneration of creative professionals, an interpretation of intellectual property law 
that would frame runway models as performers would not only be consistent with the law, 
but it would also be, more importantly, à la mode.  
                                                             
102 See for example, ‘Project Runway’ (2004-present),‘RuPaul’s Drag Race’ (2009-present), ‘The Face’ (2012-
present) and Make Me a Supermodel’ (2005-2006) have produced shows for mass-distribution based on fashion 
designing and runway modelling performances.  
